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ON THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE IN THE GENOCIDE CASE AND ON THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROFESSOR LOUIS SOHN,
Gudmundur Eiriksson*
I thank the Editors of the Journal for this kind invitation to speak to you
tonight.
When I received the invitation, having just read an article by Judge
Buergenthal in the American Journal of International Law,2 I had been
reflecting on the recent passing of one of my mentors, Professor Louis Sohn,
who was such an important force at this University in one of the last stages of
his profound career. I thought it would be appropriate to use this occasion to
say a few words about his contribution to the development of international law.
The invitation also coincided with the handing down of the most recent
judgment of the International Court of Justice, in the Genocide case brought
by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro.' I would like to
share some of my thoughts on the impact of this decision on the state of
international law. In fact, this decision may prove to be one of the court's most
controversial, for reasons very similar to those pertaining to its Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion4 and its decision in the Nicaragua5 case. I will not,
of course, be dealing extensively with what is an extremely complicated case.
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For example, I will not be dealing with the jurisdictional issues, with a
convoluted set of facts relating to the status of Serbia upon the dissolution of
Yugoslavia as a successor State and its membership in the United Nations, and
accordingly, whether it was at various periods of the proceedings a party to the
Genocide Convention or had access to the court. The court's conclusions on
these issues are very fact-specific, more so even than in the case of most
jurisdictional questions, and will probably have no lasting consequences on the
court's general jurisprudence. What I will be dealing with is the court's
treatment of the nature of genocide, state responsibility and attributability of
individual criminal acts, and the consequent relationship between the various
existing international courts; in short, those elements of the case which impact
on the theme of my thoughts on the state of international law in contemporary
international society.
Indeed, for the field of international law, the past few years have been both
the worst of times and the best of times. I come to this period with, shall we
say, many many years of experience in the three facets of international law
practice: as an advocate, as an academic, and a judge. I have to conclude that
in all this time, the most recent years have been by far the most turbulent from
the point of view of challenges and opportunities presented to the discipline of
international law. I need only mention the Rwanda genocide, the situation in
former Yugoslavia, which sets the framework for the case I just mentioned,
globalization challenges to the world trade structure, pressures caused by
pandemics and the electronic age to the international intellectual property
regime, the invasions of Kuwait by Iraq and of Iraq by the United States and
its allies, and international terrorism and the effect of responses to it on the
international human rights system, as exemplified by the Guantanamo
litigation in the United States.
Against this litany, how can I have said it was also "the best of times"? I
will go into this in some detail later, but for the moment I can say in summary
that for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the Cold War is no more,
that there is a vitalized Security Council, and that an intelligent world public
opinion has been engaged, there have been real and, at least in my case,
unpredicted responses, which have influenced the development of international
law and the public perception of its relevance to the solution of international
disputes.
This brings me to say a few words in tribute to the late Louis Sohn.
To speak of Louis Sohn as a pioneer in our field is a gross understatement.
I remember him telling me of his experience as a legal advisor both at the San
Francisco Conference and in the preparatory work leading up to the
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Conference. Of course, the negotiation of the United Nations Charter yielded
the substantive basis for all of Louis Sohn's later work in the field of
international law. Moreover, he was to follow throughout his life the process
he identified in that negotiation-the close working together of colleagues of
often opposite persuasions, but with a shared discipline, to reach a common
goal. In one article, he described the silent revolution that began in San
Francisco, which deprived the sovereign states of what he called "the lordly
privilege of being the sole possessors of rights under international law," as the
equivalent of the French revolution ending the divine right of kings.6 Yet,
Louis Sohn was not a rash revolutionary. He wrote of the new law as needing
to be accepted by the world's nations, as reflecting the common opinion of
mankind; law could not, he said, "be really instant law, but in the long run this
method was better and safer."7
Louis Sohn's talents were never more evident than in the forum in which
I first came to know him, in the negotiations for the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, beginning in 1973 and ending in 1982. If
ever it can be said that there was a right place for the right man, this was it. I
will not say single-handedly, but certainly instrumentally, he set up and led the
consultations which resulted in the settlement of disputes regime agreed in the
Convention, including the establishment of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea on which I served. I cannot elaborate fully here, but in order
to understand his achievement, one must remember that in the 1970s the very
principle of third-party dispute settlement was out of favour in virtually all
comers of the world for varying reasons. In this climate, Professor Sohn, then
member of the United States delegation at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, was able to assemble like-minded and, I
would say, similarly idealistic colleagues from the most influential countries
to counteract the prevailing distrust to fashion a comprehensive system of
courts, arbitration, and conciliation, which came to be the model for later
negotiations. I have argued elsewhere that this system and the trust it inspired
is the genesis of the completely changed panorama today, with a plethora of
courts and cases brought before them in an order of magnitude which could not
even reasonably have been dreamt of in the 1970s.
In fact, perhaps the most significant feature of the Genocide case is that it
was brought at all; that the applicant, at a time when the conflict was still on-
6 Louis B. Sohn, The NewlnternationalLaw: Protection oftheRights oflndividuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1982).
' Louis B. Sohn, The Shaping ofInternationalLaw, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1,25 (1978).
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going, should have turned to the court as a viable alternative to address the
issues of war and peace and the horrendous issues of crimes against humanity
being perpetrated.
In fact, a persistent and, I say, paradoxical criticism of our discipline is that
it is too political or that it is not political enough. As for the latter, I can share
with you the despair I have experienced as a government legal advisor when
my colleagues from other government departments sought to characterize an
issue as "political," and thus outside the ambit of my authority to advise.
It is on those occasions that I found solace in the words of another of my
mentors, Professor Louis Henkin, who attacked the dichotomy between law
and politics: "law is politics," he wrote.8 I find that a refreshing approach.
Too often one hears reference to seeking a "political" solution, as opposed to
a "legal" solution. When one sees the nature of politics, as Professor Henkin
does, as the way participants in a society, whether it be domestic or
international society, order their affairs, then the dichotomy is a half-truth at
best.
In the context of the Genocide case, we see a political situation in extremis,
with entities involved in that most political of activities, the use of force by one
state against another. Nonetheless, the court (and I hasten to add that there
was dissent on this among the judges) felt that it had the ability to address the
legal consequences of the political activity. It must be added here that the
efforts by the court to prevent the atrocities, which were ongoing when it first
took up the case, were unsuccessful, but this is because of the failure of the
parties to abide by its preliminary decisions, not because the court thought
itself incompetent to rule on these fundamental questions.
The other side of the political coin reacts to the presentation of the
international system as one without that most rudimentary of political
functions, that of lawmaking. But this, too, is an oversimplification.
All of my professional life, I have been involved in very active lawmaking
under the auspices of the United Nations or the European legal systems. An
entire international human rights regime has evolved during this period. Here
again, the contribution of Louis Sohn has been acknowledged.9 Even in the
more traditional fields there has been momentous activity. For example, in the
law of the sea, a field I mentioned earlier, the activities on 70% of the earth's
surface are now closely regulated by law, and I add the fields of treaty
8 Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 4 (1995).
' See, e.g., Jo M. Pasqualucci, Louis Sohn: Grandfather ofInternational Human Rights Law
in the United States, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 924 (1998).
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relations, diplomatic relations, outer space, watercourses, and then, most
significantly for most nations, the standards of the prohibition against the use
of force against which all modem inter-state activities are judged.
In most recent years, in reaction to the events of Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
there has been an acceleration of lawmaking in the international criminal law
field, culminating in the establishment of the International Criminal Court. I
will come in a few minutes to the question of the criminal courts per se. But
as for the corpus of the law, one by one the principles, many of which have
been debated for decades, have been ironed out. Turning again to the
Genocide case, the court has finally put to rest the dispute about whether a
state was capable of committing an international crime (through its agents or
organs). While I was a member of the United Nations International Law
Commission, this was the subject of relentless debate and I am glad that the
court has definitively addressed the issue.'" (To be fair, I would add here that
some judges dissented and others sought to re-characterize the issue.)
Let me remark in closing on another contribution of the court in the
Genocide case to the enhanced status of international law. It is axiomatic that
the parallel international society does not lend itself to the enforcement regime
found in perfectly-operating domestic societies. To be too dogmatic on this
would, however, be to ignore the fact I referred to earlier, that after the end of
the Cold War, there is a real possibility of enforcement actions by the Security
Council, imperfect though they may be. Equally importantly, I would mention
the real enforcement options introduced with the establishment of new
international courts, including in the WTO context, the law of the sea and
international criminal law, and the restructuring of the older human rights
courts. This proliferation brought with it problems of decentralization and lack
of certainty, but without going into detail, I think the results have justified the
risks. The International Court of Justice, in the Genocide case, has now
outlined a modus operandi which will serve, I believe, to enhance the
opportunities presented by this situation. While at the same time admitting its
limitations with regard to operating as a criminal court, the court did not feel
itself debarred from acting on the basis of the facts available to it, including
through a reference to the jurisprudence of the international criminal courts.
"0 In the context of the International Law Commission's work on State Responsibility, it was
able in its final articles to avoid the issue, but the court, in its wisdom, found it needed to address
the issue head-on. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, paras. 166, 179 (Feb. 26,
2007).
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In the words of Judge Tomka: "The activity of the Court has thus
complemented the judicial activity of the [Yugoslav Criminal Court] ....
Hopefully, the activities of these two judicial institutions... contribute in their
respective fields to their common obj ective-the achievement of international
justice ...""
Let me now conclude with a citation from another University of Georgia
titan, former United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who said of Louis
Sohn:
[O]ne of his greatest contributions has been his courage in
looking into the future-to look at what international law ought
to become. This has led some commentators to put him down as
something of a dreamer, but there is no doubt in my mind that the
law is steadily moving in the directions he has outlined. 2
Today, with the tendencies that I have described, including, on the basis of
a charitable reading, the most recent decision of the International Court of
Justice, Louis Sohn's dreams are coming ever closer to being realized.
"Id. para. 73 (separate opinion of Judge Tomka).
12 Dean Rusk, Introduction, 24 INT'L LAW. 619, 619 (1990).
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